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On Tax Increase Limitations:
Part I — A Costly Incoherence
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske
David Gamage Darien Shanske
Executive Summary
In this essay, the first of a series, we explore the
theoretical implications of one particular type of fis-
cal limitation on state legislatures — namely, special
rules limiting tax increases. In this first essay we will
explore the analytic soundness of these tax increase
limitations (TILs). In future essays in this series we
will analyze some of the consequences of TILs and in
particular how they can be ‘‘evaded.’’1 We will argue
over the course of this series of essays that because
there is no meaningful content to the term ‘‘tax in-
crease’’ as it is used in TILs, legislative majorities
that wish to do so can readily circumvent TILs. We
will then propose alternatives to TILs to better pro-
mote fiscal management at the state and local levels.
Introduction
Special fiscal requirements are a common feature
of state constitutions.2 In this essay we will make an
analytic observation about one type of fiscal require-
ment: state-level tax increase limitations or TILs.
By TILs we mean provisions that require a legisla-
tive supermajority for taxes to be ‘‘increased.’’ For
example, in California:
Any change in state statute which results in
any taxpayer paying a higher tax must be
imposed by an act passed by not less than
two-thirds of all members elected to each of the
two houses of the Legislature.3
It is well known that these regimes have ques-
tionable effectiveness, at least insofar as their goal
is to curb the growth of government or even simply
to change the pattern of government expenditures in
the applicable state relative to other states not
similarly constrained.4 The dominant explanations
for this failure of TILs involve the ambivalence of
voters or conniving of politicians. Without casting
doubt on these explanations, we think it important
to make an analytic observation that we believe also
contributes to the explanation of the observed phe-
nomenon of the ineffectiveness of TILs.
Our key analytic observation is that TILs insert
two conceptually vacuous notions — ‘‘tax’’ and ‘‘in-
crease’’ — into the fiscal constitutions of the states
that have them. It is at least in part because this
combination is incoherent that TILs do not work.
1See, e.g., Darien Shanske, ‘‘Going Forward by Going
Backward to Benefit Taxes,’’ California Journal of Politics
and Policy, vol. 3, iss. 2, art. 14, available at http://
www.bepress.com/cjpp/vol3/iss2/14.
2For a recent catalog and critical perspective, see Richard
Schragger, ‘‘Democracy and Debt,’’ Yale Law Journal, forth-
coming, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1943529. Note that Schragger does not spe-
cifically address TILs. TILs are often proposed to be included
in the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., SJ Res. 23, section 4, 112th
Cong. (2011).
3Calif. Const. Art. 13A, section 3a. See also, e.g., Ariz.
Const. Art. 9, section 22. Related regimes require voter
preapproval before taxes can be raised. See, e.g., Colo. Const.
Art. X, section 20(4)(a). Colorado also has a supermajority
(two-thirds) requirement as to raising taxes in an ‘‘emer-
gency.’’ See id. at section 6(a).
4See, e.g., Mathew McCubbins and Ellen Moule, ‘‘Making
Mountains of Debt Out of Molehills: The Pro-Cyclical Impli-
cations of Tax and Expenditure Limitations,’’ 63 National Tax
Journal 603 (2010); Bruce E. Cain and George A. Mackenzie,
‘‘Are California’s Fiscal Constraints Institutional or Politi-
cal?’’ Public Policy Institute of California, Dec. 2008.
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We are not going to discuss related parts of state
fiscal constitutions — provisions that are often
grouped together with TILs — namely, state or local
debt limitation regimes, special state and local bal-
anced budget rules, or tax increase limitations at the
local level. This is because all of these provisions, at
least arguably, have a different conceptual justifica-
tion (and content). Special debt limitation regimes,
for example, can be justified as important for gen-
erational equity; local tax rules may reflect a rea-
sonable concern with tax exporting or desire to
enhance local democratic participation.5
The problem with tax increase
limitation regimes at the state level
is that these regimes must
successfully define the notion of a
tax increase.
The problem with tax increase limitation regimes
at the state level is that these regimes must success-
fully define the notion of a tax increase. Yet, to borrow
a striking image from Dan Shaviro, attempting to
make sense of this concept is like playing a game of
pin the tail on the donkey; we are all spun around and
may end up pinning the tail anywhere at all.6
Seeing Through the ‘Raising Taxes’ Mirage
Step 1: Spending Through the Tax System
We will begin with a famous example from David
Bradford.7 Bradford imagined a weapons supply tax
credit granted to arms manufacturers. The arms
manufacturers would get a tax credit in the amount
of the value of arms they deliver to the U.S. govern-
ment, say for a maximum of $100 billion.8 The U.S.
government would then reduce taxes by that same
amount ($100 billion). The government could then
claim to have slashed taxes without compromising
national security or reducing overall allocations to
public services. As Ed Kleinbard observed, this an-
ecdote illustrates the ‘‘empty formalism of our con-
cepts of Government revenues and Government ex-
penditures.’’9 It is easy enough to change the
numbers so that taxes decrease and spending in-
creases (say the credits are $150 billion) or just
about any other combination one might imagine.10
And there is no need to imagine much as govern-
ments have frequently engaged in Bradford-type
maneuvers. As Kleinbard notes, the Internal Rev-
enue Code is full of tax credits awarded to private
entities in return for satisfying the government’s
substantive policy goals; those credits are often even
administered not solely by the IRS but by the federal
agency with substantive expertise (for example, the
Department of Energy for ‘‘qualified gasification
projects’’).11 State tax systems are, of course, full of
similar credits.12
Shaviro offers a different, real-life example of
Bradford’s insight.13 In 1993 the Clinton adminis-
tration proposed taxing a greater proportion of a
recipient’s Social Security benefits under the federal
income tax. The Clinton administration reasoned
that this should count as a ‘‘spending cut’’ because,
in effect, the federal government would be out less
money. However, this characterization was chal-
lenged, including by the Congressional Budget Of-
fice, which claimed that this was really tantamount
to a tax increase because additional revenue would
be raised through the tax system rather than
smaller checks cut by the Social Security Adminis-
tration. In terms of policy, the issue of nomenclature
was vacuous, but the issue was important in terms
of politics precisely because it mattered in what
ratio the administration combined spending cuts
and tax increases. State constitutions, through hav-
ing special rules for tax increases, essentially man-
date that legislators contort themselves in similarly
parsing taxing from spending.
5See, e.g., Richard Briffault, ‘‘Foreword: The Disfavored
Constitution,’’ 34 Rutgers Law Journal 907, 947-949 (2003)
(on debt limitations); Kirk J. Stark, ‘‘The Right to Vote on
Taxes,’’ 96 Northwestern University Law Review 191 (2001)
(on local tax limitation regimes). Neither Briffault nor Stark
argues that current versions of these limitations are actually
achieving these other goals. See also, e.g., Yilin Hou and
Daniel L. Smith, ‘‘Do State Balanced Budget Requirements
Matter? Testing Two Explanatory Frameworks,’’ 145 Public
Choice 57 (2010) (looking at the effects of some balanced
budget rule regimes).
6See Daniel N. Shaviro, Taxes, Spending, and the U.S.
Government’s March Toward Bankruptcy 16 (2007). See also
David Gamage and Jeremy Bearer-Friend, ‘‘Managing Fiscal
Volatility by Redefining Tax Cuts and Tax Hikes,’’ State Tax
Notes, Oct. 11, 2010, p. 113, Doc 2010-20216, or 2010 STT
196-1.
7Daniel N. Shaviro, Do Deficits Matter? 101-102 (1997).
8This simple example assumes the manufacturers have
sufficient income; one can also imagine a refundable credit.
9Edward D. Kleinbard, ‘‘The Congress Within Congress,’’
36 Ohio Northern University Law Review 1, 2 (2010).
10For further discussion, see David Gamage and Darien
Shanske, ‘‘Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience
and Political Salience,’’ 65 Tax Law Review, at Part I.B.6.b.
(forthcoming, 2012).
11Kleinbard, supra note 9, at 2 (discussing 2009-16 IRB
802, a notice about implementing IRC section 48B).
12See, e.g., Calif. Revenue and Taxation Code section
6010.8 (granting the California Alternative Energy and Ad-
vanced Transportation Financing Authority power to grant
sales and use tax exclusions). For a full listing of tax expen-
ditures in California, see, for example, Department of Fi-
nance, ‘‘Tax Expenditure Report 2011-12.’’ At least 44 states
provide some information on their tax expenditures; see
http://www.itepnet.org/other_resources/state_tereport.php.
13Daniel N. Shaviro, ‘‘Rethinking Tax Expenditures and
Fiscal Language,’’ 57 Tax Law Review 187, 192-194 (2004).
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In the end, our first analytic point relies on the
fact that state tax systems, like the federal system,
are riddled with so-called tax expenditures; that is,
governments are spending money on desired pro-
grams through the tax code. Limiting ‘‘tax increases’’
thus does not limit spending through tax expendi-
tures nor does it prevent politicians from raising
more revenue by reducing tax expenditures.
Step 2: No Ideal Tax Baseline
It could perhaps be argued that this problem can
be fixed. If only politicians were barred from using
tax expenditures,14 they would have only one option
if they wanted to fund a new program (without
incurring debt): increase taxes. In such a world,
TILs would have more bite. But it is not so simple.
First, the search for a firm definition of what consti-
tutes a tax expenditure has been elusive; there is no
ideal baseline for any tax. Take the example of the
deduction allowed for state and local tax (SALT).
The federal government lists this provision as a tax
expenditure,15 but it is arguably appropriate on
traditional income tax grounds because it reflects
the fact that some taxpayers are less well off to the
extent that they pay higher state and local taxes
that do not benefit them.16
Step 3: Wrong Question
Perhaps it is possible that some rough baseline
could be established for ‘‘tax expenditures’’ and that
this baseline could be made enforceable,17 and that
thereby the notion of a tax increase could be given
some practical substance. But the question would
then become whether this notion of tax increases
would be of any use; we think it would not. We will
start with the broadest substantive issues made
murky by the focus on ‘‘tax increases.’’
Allocation and Distribution
The efficiency and equity of a unified system of
taxing and spending are substantive questions. It
may not matter whether taxing Social Security
benefits is a tax increase or a spending decrease, but
it matters a great deal as a consideration of equity
whether Social Security is, in effect, means tested.
Further, as a consideration of the efficient allocation
of government resources, it matters a great deal
whether the SALT deduction is encouraging efficient
or inefficient uses of government resources. Whether
these issues should be categorized as tax increases is
beside the point.
Tax System or Other Government
Bureaucracy?
We have seen that bringing content to the term
‘‘tax increases’’ requires vilifying tax expenditures,
but is this appropriate? In many cases, we think not.
It can be highly desirable on both allocative and
distributive grounds to use the tax system to achieve
social ends that could be plausibly characterized as
tax expenditures.18 In the alternative, it could be
sensible to use a nontax agency to achieve a tax
objective, assuming we could agree on what a tax
objective would be.19
It can be highly desirable on both
allocative and distributive grounds
to use the tax system to achieve
social ends that could be plausibly
characterized as tax expenditures.
Because using the tax system for apparently non-
tax ends is more common and because, as discussed
above, this is the expedient that is so threatening to
TILs, this is the scenario we will focus on and justify,
at least as a general possibility. Consider government
support for higher education and suppose we would
like a government program making higher education
more broadly available to be administered in propor-
tion to income. To reach that distributive goal most
efficiently we might reasonably want to use the in-
come tax system because the tax bureaucracy is al-
ready aware of a taxpayer’s income. This is not nec-
essarily the case, but it is surely plausible and will be
true for some programs at least sometimes. Thus,
even if we could ban tax expenditures in order to
make TILs effective, we may not want to, because tax
expenditures may sometimes be the best policy op-
tion, at least insofar as labeling a program a tax
expenditure facilitates the program being adminis-
tered through the tax bureaucracy.
14Of course, it is not at all clear how that could be
achieved.
15See, e.g., Joint Committee on Taxation, ‘‘Estimates of
Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2009-2013,’’ at 49,
50 (Jan. 11, 2010).
16See generally Louis Kaplow, ‘‘Fiscal Federalism and the
Deductibility of State and Local Taxes Under the Federal
Income Tax,’’ 82 Virginia Law Review 413 (1996).
17We think not, of course. We will further discuss the
problems with attempts to establish such a baseline in our
next essay in this series. Discussion on this point can also be
found in Shanske, supra note 1.
18Cf. Shaviro, Bankruptcy, supra note 6, at 30-40 (applying
Musgrave’s allocative and distributive roles of government to
analysis of taxing and spending); David A. Weisbach and
Jacob Nussim, ‘‘The Integration of Tax and Spending Pro-
grams,’’ 113 Yale Law Journal 955 (2004) (arguing for prag-
matic analysis of whether a program should be administered
through the tax code).
19If it is a tax objective to lower the rate of tax on some
energy investments, choosing to administer tax credits
through federal or state energy agencies, as discussed above,
would qualify as an example of using a nontax agency to
administer a tax program.
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Taxation or Other Governmental
Intervention (e.g., Regulation)?
It is well understood that regulations can act as
substitutes for taxation.20 That is a specific illustra-
tion of the previous point about the continuity be-
tween the tax bureaucracy and other parts of the
government. The aspect we emphasize in this sub-
section is the continuity between different kinds of
government interventions. Sometimes it makes al-
locative or distributive sense to use a regulation, and
at other times a tax. TILs put pressure on govern-
ments to use regulations and not taxes, but in many
cases taxes might be the more desirable option on
allocative or distributive grounds. Thus, for instance,
economists tend to favor the use of carbon taxes to
combat global warming,21 but such taxes, as ‘‘taxes,’’
are off the table politically in part because a state
such as California could not impose or increase car-
bon taxes without a two-thirds legislative majority.
The fixation on avoiding tax
increases can do more than
influence the choice of
government action; it can also
shape the choice of tax base.
The fixation on avoiding tax increases can do
more than influence the choice of government ac-
tion; it can also shape the choice of tax base. For
instance, if tax rates cannot be increased without a
supermajority, legislatures have an incentive to fa-
vor tax bases that show significant revenue growth.
Of course, those tax bases also tend to be more
volatile, encouraging a feast-or-famine pattern of
state budgeting when state governments both ex-
pand and contract according to ever more severe
cycles, about the least efficient result imaginable.22
Special Case of Fees: It is not controversial that
the price mechanism is the gold standard for achiev-
ing allocative efficiency and, unsurprisingly, econo-
mists have urged government regulators to use the
price mechanism to the extent possible — for in-
stance, using tolls to regulate use of a bridge. Those
quasi-market levies are based on the benefit prin-
ciple. That is, each user of a government service is
charged in proportion to how much that user ben-
efits. We should note right away that in many ways
a toll is as much a top-down command as a regula-
tion regarding the number of cars allowed on a
bridge (say by permit) would be. Yet the toll, that is,
a taxlike intervention, makes more sense because
we do not want to create a new bridge permit
bureaucracy (say because of the administrative ex-
pense and uncertainty regarding the optimal num-
ber of vehicles). What we want to achieve is to send
a (relatively flexible) price signal about the cost of
driving in order to try to cause drivers to internalize
the externalities caused by their driving.
Fees, insofar as they are a regulation that raises
revenue for government programs, are particularly
fungible with taxes. There is no clear line between
what is a tax and what is a fee. At the one end is a
user fee, say for trash pickup, and at the other end a
national tax, say the federal income tax. We will just
stipulate that the federal income tax is not a fee, but
there is a broad continuum among many other taxes
and fees. For instance, take a user fee for trash col-
lection. This user fee is an average price, not likely
the cost of your trash pickup, and indeed, buried in
the price of pickup may well be cross-subsidies for
other users required by government regulation. Thus
even this fee is not a perfect price and thus is ‘‘tax-
like.’’And then consider local property taxes; they are
more tied to specific benefits than federal income
taxes, but they are less tied to a specific benefit than
a trash collection fee. Even state-level taxes are tied
to the benefit principle to some extent; there is at
least some mobility among states and it would seem
that some taxpayers move to the package of taxes and
spending that they desire. This perplexity regarding
the nature of state and local taxes is at the root of the
difficulties in analyzing the SALT deduction using
ordinary income tax principles. Making the fee-tax
question so important puts enormous pressure on
tax-fee jurisprudence.23
20For discussion, see Gamage and Shanske, supra note 10,
at Part I.B.6.c.
21See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and David M. Uhlmann,
‘‘Combating Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a
Better Response to Global Warming Than Cap and Trade,’’ 28
Stanford Environmental Law Journal 3 (2009) (summarizing
arguments).
22David Gamage, ‘‘Preventing State Budget Crises: Rede-
fining ‘Tax Cuts’ and ‘Tax Hikes’,’’ 98 California Law Review
749, 757-760 (2010).
23In California, for instance, tax limitations of various
kinds have encouraged state and local governments to raise
revenue with ‘‘nontaxes.’’ When courts have upheld the use of
these nontaxes, additional voter propositions have often fol-
lowed. California governments are now absorbing the latest
tax limitation initiative, Proposition 26, passed in November
2010. Proposition 26, which added sections to articles 13A and
13C of the California Constitution, explicitly aimed to narrow
the definition of a fee, responding to one California Supreme
Court case in particular. See Shanske, supra note 1. The
litigation over the meaning of Proposition 26 has already
begun. Kathleen K. Wright, ‘‘The Aftermath of California’s
Proposition 26,’’ State Tax Notes, Nov. 14, 2011, p. 471, Doc
2011-22949, or 2011 STT 220-4. Yet this is far from a Califor-
nia problem; battles over the tax-fee distinction are endemic
to other states with TILs. See, e.g., Barber v. Ritter, 196 P.3d
238, 248-250 (Colo. 2008); Keller v. Marion County Ambulance
District, 820 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. banc 1991) (distinguishing
taxes from fees for purposes of Missouri’s TIL even though the
TIL speaks of limiting ‘‘any tax, license or fees’’).
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Special rules about taxes versus fees are a dis-
traction from the hard question of whether fees or
taxes are preferable in particular cases. For in-
stance, does it make sense to advance the use of
recycling by means of regulation or by fees? TILs
should not be relevant to this discussion.
Step 4: Random Direction
It could be maintained that at least TILs exert
some sort of pressure to shrink the size of govern-
ment and should therefore be supported, even if this
would require relying on crude distinctions and
giving up on some desirable policy tools. Yet even
this is not so. Suppose, as many critics contend, that
TILs encourage the use of regulation when taxing
would be more allocatively efficient — then TILs
have in effect increased the size of government by
any meaningful measure.24 This is because the most
rigorous definition of the size of government refers
to how much government activity distorts the
economy compared with an appropriate baseline,
and adding new inefficient regulations distorts the
economy more, not less.
This confusion extends to considering other gov-
ernment interventions. As we saw in Step 1, tax ex-
penditures, which are not subject to TILs regimes,
expand the size of a government both allocatively and
distributively in much the same way direct spending
does. Banning tax expenditures would not make the
situation better, even if that were possible (Step 2).
After all, as we discussed in Step 3, a well-designed
credit can reduce the footprint of the government.
Costs of Confusion
Now that we have elaborated on the many levels
of conceptual confusion underlying TILs, we can see
why they were always doomed to be ineffective.
Legislatures could always act through tax expendi-
tures or regulations regardless of TILs, and they
could do so with considerable justification in specific
cases. Hence, unsurprisingly, states with TILs ex-
pand and contract their governments in response to
the same political pressures as other states. Further,
TILs are not benign contributions to political thea-
ter. They put enormous pressure on state law tax-fee
doctrines, distract from substantive issues, and even
nudge states toward inferior policy choices.
We will argue in our next essay in this series that
TILs cannot prevent determined legislative majori-
ties that are not supermajorities from effectively
raising additional revenue to fund government ac-
tivity. But even if TILs could succeed in reducing the
scope for effective government action, that does not
imply that TILs could reduce the size of government.
Again, any meaningful measurement for the size of
government from the perspective of those who wish
to ‘‘starve the beast’’ must consider the aggregate
effect of government action on citizens and the
economy. To the extent that TILs divert government
activity into less effective forms — such as inducing
the use of regulations when direct spending would be
more effective — this may reduce the scope for ben-
eficial government action, but it will not necessarily
shrink the size of government. Making government
less effective is likely to increase the aggregate effect
of government activity on citizens and the economy.
TILs put enormous pressure on
state law tax-fee doctrines, distract
from substantive issues, and even
nudge states toward inferior policy
choices.
To end with an illustration, imagine that you ob-
tain an injunction against your neighbor throwing
noisy parties. If your neighbor responds to the in-
junction by instead playing loud music or turning up
the television volume, your injunction may have
made your neighbor worse off to the extent he would
have preferred to throw parties, but you may well fail
to reduce your neighbor’s adverse impact on you,
because the music or television may prove even more
bothersome than the parties. In order to ‘‘starve the
beast’’ of your neighbor’s noise pollution, you must be
able to prevent all of your neighbor’s noisy activities.
But when we move to the TILs context, we will argue
that it is not possible to prevent all alternatives to
government taxing and spending. As we will explain
further in future essays, TILs thus cannot effectively
starve the beast. Instead, TILs mostly serve to make
governments less effective without reducing the ag-
gregate impact of government activity. ✰
24See, e.g., Shaviro, Bankruptcy, supra note 6, at 40.
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